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ABSTRACT 
 
The article discusses Nicholas Rescher’s metaphilosophical view of orientational 
pluralism. In his essay Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay towards Orienta-
tional Pluralism in Metaphilosophy Rescher explains a substantial difference be-
tween philosophy and science—namely, that philosophers—differently than scien-
tists—continuously propose and undermine various solutions to the same old prob-
lems. In philosophy it is difficult to find any consensus or convergence of theories. 
According to Rescher, this pluralism of theoretical positions is caused by holding by  
philosophers different sets and hierarchies of cognitive values, i.e. methodological 
orientations. These orientations are chosen in virtue of some practical postulates, 
they are of axiological, normative, but not strictly theoretical character. Different 
methodological orientations yield different evaluations of philosophical theses and 
arguments.  
This article shows that Rescher’s account does not determine clearly acceptable 
cognitive values.  If there are no clear criteria of evaluation of methodological orien-
tations, then the described view seems to be identical to relativism adopting the 
everything goes rule. In addition, accepting orientational pluralism it is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that discussions between various philosophical schools are 
futile or can be reduced to non-rational persuasion. 
Keywords: metaphilosophy, Nicholas Rescher, relativism, methodology of  phi-
losophy, orientational pluralism. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Philosophy, since its beginning, has been criticized for its inconclusive 
nature. Philosophical disagreements rarely end with a relatively permanent 
consensus. The same problems are investigated over and over again; old 
solutions are repeatedly proposed, although expressed in various terminolo-
gies. Whereas in science we can observe a cumulative progress: old prob-
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lems usually have widely accepted solutions and new ones are solved  
according to commonly accepted rules. Thus it is not surprising that philos-
ophy have been attacked for its inconclusiveness. Among others ancient 
skeptics insisted that philosophical efforts were futile. They asserted that 
philosophical questions were undecidable, so they recommended suspend-
ing judgement. Descartes tried to elaborate an effective method as well as  
a base of indisputable premises in order to rebuild a whole body of 
knowledge. Neopositivism repudiated some areas of philosophy, including 
metaphysics as the set of nonsensical pseudo-problems.1  
Is the enterprise of philosophy futile? How does science omit corre-
spondent difficulties?  In this essay we will outline and discuss the answer 
given by Nicholas Rescher2 who proposes the metaphilosophical theory 
called orientational pluralism. 
 
 
2. EXPOSITION OF RESCHER’S  
ORIENTATIONAL PLURALISM 
 
At least three explanations of the problematic situation of philosophy are 
offered. Firstly, it has been pointed out that philosophy promotes originality 
of thought, encouraging philosophers to unhesitatingly disprove existing 
conceptions and modes of argumentation. Secondly, it has been suspected 
that it is the lack of one methodology which causes unending disputes.  
Thirdly, it has been claimed that philosophy is concerned with essentially 
undecidable questions. Rescher provides an alternative explanation. He 
postulates that the troublesome situation of philosophy is attributable to the 
nature of its problems. They are decidable but not absolutely and therein 
lies the source of disagreement lies. 
Rescher specifies the form of genuinely philosophical problem as an  
aporetic cluster. In this domain we can observe groups of interrelated but 
incompatible theses. Each of them might be provided with persuasive argu-
ments and is based on our intuitions. A solution to a philosophical problem 
denies some of them in order to avoid inconsistency. Rescher gives the fol-
lowing example of such situation:   
 
„… a major family of controversies in moral philosophy revolves about the fol-
lowing inconsistent triad of theses: 
 
(1) (Ethical Cognitivism) We have knowledge of certain ethical facts. 
(2) (Ethical Autonomy) Neither experience nor reasoning yields ethical 
knowledge. 
————————— 
1 N. Joll, Contemporary Metaphilosophy, in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010 
[19.06.2017] <http://www.iep.utm.edu/con-meta/>. 
2 N. Rescher, Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay Towards Orientational Pluralism in 
Metaphilosophy, The Review of Metaphysics, 32, 1978, 217–251. 
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(3) (Empiricism) There is no source of knowledge apart from experience and 
reasoning. 
Various major positions can be exfoliated from the alternative modes of reso-
lution of this controversy. Thus Ethical skepticism reasons from (2) and (3) to 
the denial of (1). Ethical intuitionism reasons from (1) and (2) to the denial of 
(3). Ethical naturalism reasons from (1) and (3) to the denial of (2).”3 
 
 We have already seen that introducing only positive argumentation is in-
sufficient, because each of the theses of a given aporetic cluster can be pro-
vided with a supporting argument. Hence, the situation requires the refuta-
tion of the argumentation supporting the denied theses. According to 
Rescher, it is not enough to give a counterargument. The standard way of 
proceeding in philosophy is to evaluate not only arguments, but also the 
inherent plausibility of their conclusions and consequences. 
In order to take a stance it is necessary to analyse intellectual costs and 
benefits, which include defining and weighing some parameters of compet-
ing solutions to a problem. Rescher enumerates “formal criteria like con-
sistency, uniformity […] comprehensiveness, systematic elegance, simplici-
ty, economy (‘Ockham’s razor’, etc.), but also various material criteria like 
closeness to common sense, explanatory adequacy, inherent plausibility, 
allocations of presumptions and burden of proof.”4 By using the criteria in 
question, philosophers follow their methodological (or probative) orienta-
tions, i.e. predispositions to a certain mode of evaluation. This kind of gen-
eral attitude is a necessary condition of proceeding towards a solution of any 
problem and that is why it is indispensable. Probative orientation does not 
consist of a body of basic assumptions or modes of reasoning but it is an 
axiological attitude establishing a hierarchy of cognitive values. It limits the 
range of alternative philosophical stances in such a way that only one of 
them is adequate. Another requirement is being intelligible for debaters 
following another methodological orientation. 
Sciences, in contrast to philosophy, evolve toward a stable consensus, 
precisely because they generally share cognitive values. However, probative 
orientations and the related methods of solving problems themselves also 
constitute a philosophical issue. Fruitful investigations concerning them 
also presuppose that one follows some set of cognitive values. Rescher “… 
reach[es] the position of what might be called an orientational pluralism in phi-
losophy—a view which has it that there are different and [...] equally eligible 
alternative evaluative orientations which underwrite different and mutually 
incompatible resolution of philosophical issues.”5 
In Rescher’s view, since there is no one correct hierarchy or set of cogni-
tive values, philosophical theories can be true or adequate only relatively to 
————————— 
3 Ibidem,  221–222. 
4 Ibidem,  225. 
5 Ibidem,  229. 
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some probative orientation. His orientational pluralism is a metaphilosoph-
ical relativism—reality investigated by philosophy is multifaced. It is not the 
case that only one of the alternative solutions to a problem from the domain 
is correct, or that philosophical problems are not related to reality. The rule 
everything goes does not obtain. Each philosopher works following one and 
only one methodological orientation which admits a particular solution to  
a given issue. And because of that, as Rescher tells us, on the basic level of 
philosophical work one must proceed (and actually proceeds) as if one ac-
cepted metaphilosophical absolutism. 
The outlined metaphilosophical conception, according to Rescher, does 
not imply either skepticism or indifferentism (or quietism). Pursuing phi-
losophy is indispensable by virtue of significance of its questions and the 
natural tendency of the human mind to grapple with its issues. Suspending 
judgement in philosophy is not a proper reaction in the described situation, 
for on the basic level of reflection, given a particular set of cognitive values, 
there is no isothenia and isothenia on the meta-level does not entail epoché 
on the basic level. It  also is not neutral which of alternative answers to phil-
osophical question should be picked. The philosopher occupies a particular 
probative orientation which determines standards of rational selection of an 
adequate theoretical option. In addition, Rescher points out that his 
metaphilosophy can be useful as it enables respect to other participants in 
the philosophical discussion which is of crucial importance in the develop-
ment of the discipline of philosophy. Mutual critique stimulates to improve 
one’s argumentation and to develop conceptions adequate to one’s set of 
cognitive values. In philosophy, as it has been said, there are no ultimate or 
absolute solutions. Successive proposals of argumentation are rejected 
sooner or later. This domain of human reflection is a kind of communal ven-
ture consisting of high quality debate progressively producing more respect-
able theories. 
Rescher’s relativism entails that one cannot ascribe to anyone a philo-
sophical knowledge or truth. The metatheoretical view on the discipline 
enables only to ascribe the knowledge of philosophy—of some theses and 
arguments—which is the domain of the history of philosophy. The main goal 
of inquiry in philosophy is not absolute truth but rather the warranted as-
sertability of certain theses in relation to given probative orientation. 
 
 
3. CRITICAL DISCUSSION 
 
It is worth noting that Rescher’s conception is not only a metatheory of 
philosophy and an account for its problematic situation, but also a norma-
tive proposal. The author defines the aim of the enterprise, the proper atti-
tude towards the discipline and determines the framework which delimits 
activity in this field. The proper stance consists of acceptance of intelligible 
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probative orientation and methodological absolutism (or monism) on the 
basic level of investigation. Rescher points out that the standards of rational 
settlement of philosophical issues are internal to a given methodological 
orientation. Therefore, it seems that cultivating this discipline in a responsi-
ble way should begin with a clear and distinct exposition of cognitive values 
which one follows. Without this step expressing one’s theoretical views 
might be regarded as futile because evaluating their adequacy would be 
problematic. 
Theoretical components of the orientational pluralism appeal to the no-
tion of cognitive values. The condition of intelligibility delimits acceptable 
methodological orientations and, intermediately, cognitive axiologies. How-
ever, this condition is too weak, so it seems that the objection of everything 
goes can be provided and Rescher’s metaphilosophical view can be consid-
ered as relativistic.  
Although in sciences there is a general agreement on cognitive values, in 
the light of Rescher’s theses, scientific theories have only a conditional form 
—theory T is correct only in the light of a given cognitive axiology. If one 
can change his/her methodological orientation in philosophy, why should 
we claim that it is impossible in science? Metaphilosophical relativism, then, 
is exposed to critique as being engaged in the consensual theory of truth. It 
is because the  consensus on cognitive values determines ascriptions of truth 
values. However, Rescher can keep this question open and claim that such a 
conception of truth is adequate according to the cognitive values which he 
accepts.6 
Rescher’s thesis does not explain how the discussion between philoso-
phers adopting various sets of cognitive values can influence on improving 
their argumentation or theses evaluated within respective methodological 
orientations. Such improvement would be possible if the representatives of 
different strands argued about the adequacy of reasoning to proposed con-
clusions on the assumption that particular methods were applied. But in 
such a case philosophy should be metatheoretically described in absolutistic 
terms—as disagreement on the correctness of conditional statements of 
some kind. Rescher could reply that the antecedents of such statements do 
not express genuine propositions, but rather axiological attitudes or modes 
of evaluation. However, in such a situation controversies between repre-
sentatives of different philosophical strands could be convincingly charac-
terized as attempts to mutual persuasion. It would be a local instance of an 
ultimate incompatibility in so called forms of life described in Ludwig Witt-
genstein’s On Certainty: 
 
“611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with 
one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. 
————————— 
6 M. Marsonet, Nicholas Rescher (1928–), in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009 
[19.06.2017] <http://www.iep.utm.edu/rescher/>. 
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612. I said I would ‘combat’ the other man—but wouldn’t I give him reasons? 
Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. 
(Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.).”7 In such case, 
Rescher’s proposal should be consequently treated as a subject of pragmatic 
choice, rather than theoretic one.”? 
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O NICHOLASA RESHCERA ORIENTACYJNYM PLURALIZMIE  
W METAFILOZOFII  
 
STRESZCZENIE 
 
Artykuł przedstawia metafilozoficzne poglądy Nicholasa Reschera i pewne uwagi 
krytyczne pod adresem jego koncepcji orientacyjnego pluralizmu. W swym tekście 
Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay towards Orientational Pluralism in Meta-
philosophy Rescher wyjaśnia istotną różnicę pomiędzy filozofią a nauką: filozofowie 
nieustannie proponują i odrzucają różne rozstrzygnięcia tych samych dawnych pro-
blemów. W filozofii trudno dostrzec konsens lub konwergencję teorii. Zdaniem  
Reschera pluralizm stanowisk jest spowodowany tym, że filozofowie przyjmują róż-
ne zbiory i hierarchie wartości poznawczych, tj. różne metodologiczne orientacje,  
wybierane na mocy pewnych postulatów praktycznych i mające charakter aksjolo-
giczny, normatywny. Różne takie orientacje rozmaicie oceniają filozoficzne tezy  
i argumenty. W artykule pokazuję, że Rescher nie wyznacza jasno zbioru dopusz-
czalnych wartości poznawczych. Jeśli nie ma kryteriów oceny orientacji metodolo-
gicznych, to stanowisko Reschera wydaje się identyczne z tezą radykalnego relatywi-
zmu: „wszystko jest dozwolone”. Ponadto, gdy akceptuje się orientacyjny pluralizm, 
trudno jest uniknąć konkluzji mówiącej, że dyskusje pomiędzy różnymi szkołami 
filozoficznymi są daremne lub redukowalne do nieracjonalnej perswazji.  
Słowa kluczowe: metafilozofia, Nicholas Rescher, relatywizm, metodologia  
filozofii, pluralizm orientacyjny. 
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